We consider an infinite-horizon single-product pricing problem in which a fraction of customers is patient and the remaining fraction is impatient. A patient customer will wait up to some fixed number of time periods for the price of the product to fall below his or her valuation at which point the customer will make a purchase. If the price does not fall below a patient customer's valuation at any time during those periods, then that customer will leave without buying. In contrast, impatient customers will not wait, and either buy immediately or leave without buying. We prove that there is an optimal dynamic pricing policy comprised of repeating cycles of decreasing prices. We obtain bounds on the length of these cycles, and we exploit these results to produce an efficient dynamic programming approach for computing such an optimal policy. We also consider problems in which customers have variable levels of patience and develop bounds and heuristics.
Introduction
When faced with a posted price for a particular product, some customers may consider making a purchase but may judge that price to be too high. If such customers are willing to wait, then they may possibly purchase the product in the future if the price falls low enough. In this paper, we focus on developing dynamic pricing policies that take into account such consumer behavior.
Specifically, we consider a deterministic single-product pricing problem in which customers arrive dynamically and a portion of customers is patient. A patient customer is willing to wait up to some fixed amount of time and will purchase the product as soon as the price falls below his or her individual valuation.
Our main result is that for an infinite-horizon average-revenue objective, there is an optimal policy comprised of repeating cycles of decreasing prices. This result holds for general customer valuation distributions under the assumptions that (i) a fixed fraction of customers is patient and that such patient customers wait up to an arbitrary fixed number k of time periods, (ii) the remaining customers are impatient and willing only to make immediate purchases or to not buy, and (iii) that prices are selected from a finite set. Under additional mild assumptions, the result also holds when prices are selected from a continuous interval. We obtain bounds on the length of an optimal cycle, and we exploit a connection to a particular finite-horizon version of the problem to develop an efficient approach for computing an optimal policy. We also consider problems in which customers have variable levels of patience and develop bounds and a heuristic for such settings.
The model of patient customer behavior that we employ is essentially that studied by Ahn et al. (2007) , who consider both production and pricing decisions as well as inventory carrying costs. They consider only uniformly distributed customer valuations (linear demand curves in their terminology), but otherwise our model of customer behavior is conceptually the same as theirs.
They note that use of the uniform distribution helps make the model amenable to analysis and the development of insights. For pure pricing settings like those we consider without production decisions or inventory or capacity issues, they establish that it is optimal to alternate between a high price and a low price (except, in some instances, at the very end of the horizon) for a finite-horizon problem with uniformly distributed customer valuations and customers that wait either zero or one period. Such a pricing pattern can be viewed as a decreasing cyclic policy with two-period cycles.
The assumption that customers wait either zero or one period is the same as assuming in our setup that a fraction of customers is impatient and the remainder is patient and willing to wait just one period. It follows from their result on finite-horizon problems that cycles of alternating high and low prices are also optimal for the infinite-horizon average-revenue problems that we consider (again under the added conditions that valuations are uniformly distributed and the "patience level" is k = 1). Ahn et al. also obtain a recursive expression for the best decreasing price sequence of any given fixed length for problems that satisfy (i) and (ii) above for problems with linear demand curves. They motivate this development by commenting that for long finite horizons, policies comprised of repeated decreasing price cycles should work well. Our results show that policies of that form are in fact optimal for infinite-horizon average-revenue problems. Gümüş et al. (2013) consider a similar model to Ahn et al., but with multiple partially substitutable products.
It stands to reason that some customers may be willing to delay a purchase until the price is sufficiently low. As a practical matter, the specific behavior exhibited by our patient customers (waiting for the price to fall below their valuations) can be supported by a variety of web services and smartphone applications that track prices on, for example, Amazon.com. Such services and applications allow an individual customer to enter a particular price for a product of interest and to receive a notification whenever the price of that product falls below that particular price on Amazon.com. Upon receiving such a notification, the customer can then purchase the product in question.
The customer behavior we consider may be compared with that of what are often called strategic customers. Assumptions vary, but broadly speaking, strategic customers try to anticipate price changes and time purchases in an attempt to maximize their utility. In contrast, our patient customers do not look into the future and do not attempt to maximize utility. Rather, they may be viewed as making purchasing decisions that satisfice. One may also imagine that our patient customers simply lack the motivation or the analytical sophistication of strategic customers. We note that our use of the term "patient" differs from that found in some prior work. For example, Su (2007) uses the terms patient and impatient to distinguish how much it costs different customers to monitor prices; however, both patient and impatient customers in his paper attempt to maximize utility and hence would be considered strategic according to our taxonomy.
There is now a growing body of work in the operations research and operations management literature that deals with intertemporal pricing and inventory control in the presence of strategic customers. There is also a considerable history of research on such problems in the economics literature, much of it coming since the paper of Coase (1972) . We will not attempt to summarize this literature, but instead refer to reviews by Shen and Su (2007) and Aviv et al. (2009) . Formulations with strategic customers often involve a game between a seller and customers. The presence of strategic customers may either reduce or increase the seller's revenue in comparison to problems without strategic customers; see, e.g., Li et al. (2014) . There is also research that considers operations management problems in which some customers exhibit bounded rationality. See Huang et al. (2013) for an entry into this literature. Specifics vary across a wide array of models and problem contexts, but at a high level, boundedly rational customers do not make decisions that maximize their utility but instead use heuristics or "rules of thumb." The customers in our model can viewed as acting in this manner. Besbes and Lobel (2012) study a model similar to ours. They consider customers with varying levels of patience and establish that a cyclic pricing policy is optimal for an infinite-horizon averagerevenue problem. In our work, optimal cycles are made up of decreasing prices whereas the prices in the optimal cycles of Besbes and Lobel need not be decreasing. They also obtain bounds on the cycle lengths. Their model of consumer behavior differs from ours. Specifically, they assume that customers are strategic and that each customer will purchase at the minimum price within his window of patience so long as that minimum is below his valuation. Such customers are forward-looking in the sense that they know the seller's future prices. Models with forward-looking customers are appropriate if customers have fully learned about the seller's pricing behavior, e.g., through previous interactions. In contrast, we assume that a customer buys as soon as the price falls below that customer's valuation. Our customers are not forward looking. A model such as ours is appropriate when customers do not know the seller's behavior or are not able to learn it. Conlisk et al. (1984) study a monopolist that sells a durable good to customers who stay in the market (possibly indefinitely) until making a purchase. Each period, there arrives a fixed amount of such customers, each with one of two possible valuations for the good. Customers time their purchases to maximize their utility. The main results state that there is an optimal decreasing cyclic pricing policy in which the monopolist sets prices so that only high-valuation customers buy, except in the last period of a cycle when the price is set low enough that both high-and low-valuation customers make purchases. To draw some distinctions with our general model, we consider customers who are patient but not strategic and who wait at most a finite span of time to purchase. We also allow general valuation distributions, which means that customers in our model cannot be divided into only two categories of high and low valuation. Table 1 in Section A of the appendix summarizes central assumptions and results from our paper as well as from those papers cited above that establish optimality of cyclic pricing policies (Ahn et al. 2007 , Besbes and Lobel 2012 , Conlisk et al. 1984 .
Some of the literature on intertemporal pricing focuses on finite-horizon problems in which all customers are present at the beginning of the horizon. For instance, Besanko and Winston (1990) consider such a problem in which customers time their purchases to maximize utility. Each customer has a valuation drawn from a uniform distribution. Besanko and Winston show that in a game-theoretic equilibrium, the prices set by the seller decline over time, resulting in what is termed price skimming, which allows the seller to exploit differences in customers' valuations to capture some of the consumers' surplus. The decreasing price cycles we obtain may be viewed similarly.
The authors also make comparisons with a version of the problem with myopic customers (akin to our patient customers) who are assumed to buy as soon as the price falls below their valuations.
We emphasize, however, that in the myopic-customer model of Besanko and Winston, all customers arrive at once at the beginning of the finite time horizon. The infinite-horizon problem we consider is markedly more complex than a finite-horizon problem in which all customers arrive at once. Indeed, when all customers are myopic and arrive at the beginning of the horizon, it is not hard to see, as noted by Besanko and Winston, that an optimal policy will decrease prices over the horizon and that the prices can be obtained through a straightforward dynamic program.
A few other recent papers have considered deterministic discrete-time infinite-horizon pricing problems in which demand depends upon prices in multiple periods. Popescu and Wu (2007) consider a setting in which demand depends upon the current price and a reference price, which is a function (an exponentially weighted average) of previous prices. Their setup yields a dynamic program with a single-dimensional state, which corresponds to the current reference price. They establish that prices converge monotonically to a steady-state price. If the starting reference price is higher than the steady state, then prices decrease in what can be viewed as a price skimming policy. Nasiry and Popescu (2011) consider a similar problem with a different model of reference price formation, called peak-end archoring. They also find that prices converge monotonically.
For both models of reference price formation, prices remain fixed in steady state. This stands in contrast to the cyclic price policies we identify, a distinction that can be traced to the differences in the types of consumer behavior under consideration. Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2012) consider competing sellers that face customers whose previous consumption of products may affect their current demand for those products through a satiation effect. In their model, consumers' consumption levels converge to a steady state. They address both pricing and product design decisions, but they do not consider dynamic pricing, which is the focus of our study.
Coming back to our work, the proof of our main result proceeds roughly as follows. We first reduce the infinite-horizon average-revenue problem to a related problem of maximizing the finitehorizon average revenue over a set of policies that do not have what are termed regeneration points.
A regeneration point arises when prices are set so that there is a time point (the regeneration point) with the property that no customers who arrive before that time point buy at that time point or later. The maximization requires that we consider multiple different lengths for the finite horizon.
The optimal policy for the infinite-horizon problem is then constructed by indefinitely repeating the optimal policy of the related finite-horizon problem.
The related problem is itself difficult, and our analysis of it constitutes the core of our technical contribution. We establish through a fairly lengthy argument that there is an optimal policy comprised of decreasing prices for the related finite-horizon problem. At a high level, we reach this conclusion by making a series of comparisons between policies in which prices are judiciously added, removed, or rearranged. A key concept that we introduce for our analysis is what we call a "strong markup," which occurs (roughly speaking) whenever there is a price increase immediately after a price that is a strict running minimum. We establish that any feasible policy with price increases is made no worse by re-ordering the prices from high to low between each successive pair of strong markups. Such a re-ordering yields a policy composed of a series of decreasing strings of prices, arranged so that price increases occur only immediately after running minima.
We then argue that the best policy composed in such a way of decreasing strings is no better than a policy that is just (a slightly modified version of) its final decreasing string. We stress that the preceding is a loose explanation. Before moving forward, we note that often-used inductive methods for proving structural properties of optimal policies for pricing or inventory problems (see, for example, Section 5.4 of Porteus 2002) were not fruitful for our problem, so we instead needed to come up with a different approach.
Our developments borrow some ideas from Ahn et al. (2007) and Besbes and Lobel (2012) . For instance, the notion of a regeneration point appears in both of these papers. The preliminary steps of our analysis that reduce the infinite-horizon problem to the related finite-horizon problem closely mirror a similar reduction performed by Besbes and Lobel. The discretization procedure whereby we extend our results from a finite price set to a continuous price set also parallels an argument of Besbes and Lobel. In view of the comments in the previous paragraph and the fact that Ahn et al. have obtained results about the optimality of cyclic decreasing policies in the presence of patient customers for some settings with k = 1, one may ask if it is possible to simply adopt existing proof techniques to settings with arbitrary k ≥ 2. If we restrict our attention to the case of k = 1, then we are able to prove the optimality of cyclic decreasing policies (as we explain at the end of Section 3) without detailed analysis of the "related finite-horizon problem". However, this is not the case for k ≥ 2.
A key difference between settings with k = 1 and those with k ≥ 2 is that for k = 1 any price increase produces a regeneration point, but for k ≥ 2 it is possible to have a price increase that does not produce a regeneration point. Hence, the main complicating factor that we must address in this paper arises when moving from k = 1 to k ≥ 2. Our approach to resolving this difficulty (the "fairly lengthy argument" that allows us to identify the structure of the solution to the related finite-horizon problem) forms the technical core of our work. We emphasize that the approach does not involve the ideas (or adaptations thereof) of Ahn et al. or Besbes and Lobel , and is unique to this paper.
To summarize, the central contribution of this paper is proof that there is an optimal decreasing cyclic pricing policy for pricing problems with patient customers. We allow arbitrary customer valuation distributions and arbitrary fixed patience levels and provide bounds on optimal cycle lengths. Our results enable efficient computation of optimal policies and also motivate a heuristic that can be used when patience levels are not fixed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and states our main result. Section 3 contains the reduction to the related finite-horizon problem. Section 4 outlines the key steps in the analysis of that finite-horizon problem. Section 5 contains refinements and extensions of our main result as well as a computational algorithm. Section 6 describes bounds for problems with variable patience levels. Section 7 contains concluding comments. Section A of the appendix provides comparisons with some of the literature in a tabular format. Sections B-G of the appendix contain complete details of the proofs. Section H of the appendix presents results of numerical experiments.
Model Setup and Central Result
We study a multi-period single-product pricing problem with deterministic demand and unlimited inventory. We assume that demand is a continuous quantity and that units are scaled so that in a single period a potential new demand of 1 arrives. This demand is comprised of infinitesimal customers, a fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of which is patient and a fraction 1 − α of which is impatient.
Each patient customer has a non-negative valuation drawn from a distribution F(·). For each x, let F (x) = lim y↑x F(y) be the left limit of F(·) at x. Hence, F (x) is the fraction of patient customers whose valuation is less than x, and 1 − F (x) is the fraction of patient customers whose valuation is at least x. If F(·) is continuous, then F (·) = F(·). Likewise, each impatient customer has a nonnegative valuation drawn from a distribution F 0 (·), and we similarly define F 0 (x) = lim y↑x F 0 (y).
Let G(x) = αF (x) + (1 − α)F 0 (x) be the overall fraction of customers with a valuation less than x.
Each period the seller offers one price. If the price offered is no greater than a particular customer's valuation, then that customer (whether impatient or patient) will make a purchase immediately and then leave. If the price is above that customer's valuation, then the customer's subsequent behavior depends upon whether the customer is patient or impatient. If the customer is impatient, then he will simply leave the market without purchasing. If the customer is patient, then he will wait for up to k more periods. In those k periods, the patient customer will make a purchase as soon as the price falls to or below his valuation. If the price remains above the customer's valuation for the full k periods, then the patient customer will leave without making a purchase. We assume that k ≥ 1 is fixed.
Prices are selected from a finite set P = {p(1), . . . , p(m)} with cardinality m ≥ 2. We will be interested in both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems. Our analysis of the former will be useful for deriving our main results, which deal with the latter. For an infinite-horizon problem, a sequence p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . ) ∈ P ∞ is called a pricing policy or simply a policy. For finite L ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, . . . }, we will also call p = (p 1 , . . . , p L ) ∈ P L a policy for the finitehorizon L-period problem, and sometimes use the notation L(p) to denote the length of p. For
Similarly, for q ∈ P L 2 , we will use (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈ P ∞ to denote the infinite-horizon policy that charges q t in periods t, t + L 2 , t + 2L 2 , t + 3L 2 , . . .
where we use the convention that p t = 0 for t ≤ 0. Throughout, x + = max{x, 0}. The quantity ρ t (p) represents the revenue accrued in period t under policy p. In (1), 1 − G(p t ) represents the number of customers that arrive in period t and immediately make a purchase. The expression (1) represents the fraction of patient customers that arrive in period t − i and that have a valuation that is less than all the prices in periods t − i, . . . , t − 1 but greater than or equal to the price in period t. Keeping in mind that α is the fraction of customers that is patient, we see that α[F (min{p t−i , . . . , p t−1 }) − F (p t )] + represents the number of customers that initially arrive in period t − i and subsequently make a purchase in period t.
We are now ready to present the objective function of the seller. For p ∈ P ∞ let
denote the infinite-horizon long-run average revenue from implementing policy p ∈ P ∞ . The limit inferior above will be a limit for the optimal policy we identify. The seller's goal is to select a pricing policy to maximize the long-run average revenue, that is, it wants to solve
As in Besbes and Lobel (2012) , we say that a policy p ∈ P ∞ is cyclic if there exists a positive integer L such that p t+L = p t for all t ∈ N. The smallest L > 0 for which this holds is the cycle length of policy p. A cyclic policy with cycle length L is of the form p = (q, q, q, . . . ) where q ∈ P L .
A cyclic policy p is said be a decreasing cyclic policy if p = (q, q, q, . . . ) where
(We use decreasing to mean weakly decreasing.)
Our central result is the following.
Theorem 1 There exists a decreasing cyclic policy with cycle length L ∈ {1, . . . , m + k − 1} that is an optimal solution to (2).
In Section 5.2, under some additional mild assumptions, we obtain a lower bound of k + 1 on the cycle length. Based upon numerical results in Section H of the appendix, we also conjecture that there are broad conditions under which there is an optimal policy with decreasing cycles with length of either 1 (fixed price), k + 1, or k + 2.
In the next two sections, we build up to the proof of the preceding theorem. The proof involves reducing the problem to a suitable finite-horizon problem in Section 3 and then establishing that the finite-horizon problem has a decreasing optimal policy in Section 4.
Preliminary Analysis
The first step in the proof of the theorem above is to show that there is an optimal solution to the infinite-horizon problem (2) that cyclically repeats an optimal solution to the finite-horizon problem that is given in (5) below. To this end, we introduce some definitions. For L ∈ N and
and v L (p) denote, respectively, the total revenue and average revenue accrued over horizon 1, . . . , L under policy p; that is,
Throughout, we will show the "length subscript" on V (·) or v(·) when we wish to emphasize the length of the finite-horizon policy in question.
For p ∈ P ∞ we say that time t ≥ 2 is an I-regeneration point of p if
For L ∈ N and p ∈ P L we call time t ∈ {2, . . . , L} an F-regeneration point of p if
If t is a regeneration point, no customers who join the market prior to time t purchase in time t or later, because the prices from time t to time t + k − 1 are greater than or equal to the price in time t − 1. The modifiers "I-" and "F-" will help later to distinguish between infinite price sequences and finite price sequences. Observe that by definition, time t = 1 is not a regeneration point.
For any policy p ∈ P ∞ , we call the sequence of prices between any two successive I-regeneration The following lemma provides a link between the infinite-horizon and finite-horizon problems.
Lemma 1 Fix L ∈ N, and consider q ∈ P L and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈ P ∞ .
1. C i (p) = q for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . if and only if q has no F-regeneration points.
If q has no F-regeneration points, then
H(p) = v(q).
If q has no F-regeneration points, then p is cyclic with cycle length L(q).
The lemma is an important ingredient in the proof of the following proposition.
Define κ = k(m − 1) + 1. By Proposition 1, any optimal solution to problem (4) below is also an optimal solution to the original optimization problem (2).
s.t. p = (q, q, q, . . . ) and C i (p) = q, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
For L = 1, we define Ω(1) = P. Let Ω = ∪ κ L=1 Ω(L). We will also be interested in the following finite-horizon optimization problem. Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we see that to prove Theorem 1, it will suffice to establish that the optimization problem (5) has a decreasing optimal solution of length L ≤ m + k − 1. We take up this task below.
We close this section with a comment about the case of k = 1 in which patient customers are willing to wait one period. When k = 1 the definition (3) says that time t ≥ 2 is an F-regeneration point of q ∈ P L if q t ≥ q t−1 . Hence, the (finite) set Ω in (5) contains only strictly decreasing price sequences. In addition, κ = m when k = 1. Therefore, the above propositions imply that a decreasing cyclic policy with cycle length L ∈ {1, . . . , m} is optimal for (2). So at this point Theorem 1 is proved for k = 1 without any more work. It remains only to prove the theorem when k ≥ 2. Hence, we shall restrict our attention throughout the next section to cases with k ≥ 2. As noted in the introduction, moving from k = 1 to k ≥ 2 introduces a considerable additional level of difficulty.
Proof of the Theorem
In this section we establish that there exists an optimal solution to (5) that is decreasing and has length at most m + k − 1, from which Theorem 1 follows. We begin by providing an overview.
In the first step of the argument, we introduce the notion of a "strong markup" and we use it to help decompose the feasible set Ω of (5) into two disjoint subsets, B and D, where B is comprised of the sequences in Ω with at least one strict increase in price, and D is comprised of the sequences in Ω that are decreasing. The second step of the proof involves showing that it is possible to improve the average revenue of any policy in the set B through a particular rearrangement of its prices.
This rearrangement yields a policy that belongs to another set, which we call E. In the third step of the proof we establish that the best policy in E is not better than the best policy in D. As a consequence, we may restrict our attention to policies in D. The fourth step of the proof is to show that when maximizing over D it suffices to consider only those polices with length no greater than m + k − 1. We outline the four steps below, while leaving many of the technical details to the appendix. We conclude the section by putting the pieces of the proof together.
Step 1 of the Proof
To begin, we decompose the feasible set Ω of (5) as indicated above. We start with a few definitions.
For a policy q ∈ P L we say that there is a markup at time t ∈ {2, . . . , L} if q t > q t−1 .
Given q ∈ Ω(L), we let S 1 = {t ∈ {2, . . . , L} :
For i ≥ 2, let
. . , q t−1 }, and q t−1 < q e(i−1)−1 }.
We say that time e(i) is the time of the ith strong markup of q. At time e(1), the price strictly increases from a running minimum in the previous period e(1)−1.
For i > 1, at time e(i), the price strictly increases from a running minimum price in the previous period e(i) − 1 that is strictly less than the price in period e(i − 1) − 1. From the definition, the time of the first strong markup e(1) is also the time of the first markup. Note however that subsequent markups may not be strong markups. A policy has at least one strong markup if and only if it has at least one markup. The left panel of Figure 1 shows a policy with two strong markups (at times 3 and 10). In that figure, times 4 and 6 have markups, but not strong markups.
In a number of places throughout the remainder of the paper and in the appendix, we will make comparisons between a policy that we will call q and another policy, say q. In those settings we will use e(i) to mean the time of the ith strong markup of q. Hence, q e(i) refers to the price charged by policy q at the time of the ith strong markup of policy q. If we wish to refer to the time of ith strong markup of q, we will use the notation e(i| q). This convention will apply to other quantities that will be introduced later as well (e.g., t(i) and M (i)).
Define n(q) = max{i : S i = ∅} to be the number of strong markups of policy q. If S 1 = ∅, then we define n(q) = 0. For q ∈ Ω(L), observe that n(q) = 0 if and only if
The left panel of Figure 1 shows a policy in a B n (L). We note in passing that it is possible to have a decreasing policy q = (q 1 , . . . , q L ) with F-regeneration points (if a price repeats for at least k consecutive periods or if the final two prices are the same); such a policy is not in D(L).
From the preceding definitions we have Ω(L) = B(L) ∪ D(L).
Each policy in the feasible set Ω of problem (5) is either decreasing or in some
where B is composed of those sequences in Ω with at least one strict price increase, and D is composed of those sequences in Ω that are decreasing. This completes the "decomposition" of Ω.
Step 2 of the Proof
Next, we introduce the collection of sets {E n (L)} and show that for any policy in a set B n (L), we can find another policy (obtained by re-arranging prices between each two successive strong markups into a decreasing sequence) in E n (L) that performs at least well.
For n ≥ 1, define E n (L) as the set of sequences q ∈ P L with the property that q = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n )
where s i = (q t(i) , . . . , q t(i+1)−1 ) for some times {t(i) : i = 0, . . . , n + 1} such that 1 = t(0) < t(1) < · · · < t(n + 1) = L + 1 and
Examples of policies in an E n (L) are shown in the right panel of Figure 1 and in the left panel of Figure 2 .
Condition 1 says that a sequence in E n (L) is comprised of n + 1 decreasing subsequences.
Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that there are markups only at times {t(i) : i = 1, . . . , n}. Conditions 1-3 say that there is at least one price in subsequence s i that is strictly lower than q t(i)−1 and that q t(i)−1 is the minimum price over times 1, . . . , t(i) − 1. Condition 4 says that the first price in s i that is strictly lower than q t(i)−1 comes not too much later than time t(i) − 1, and hence t(i) is not an F-regeneration point. Policies in E n (L) have the property that all markups are strong markups.
Our interest in E n (L) stems from the next proposition.
Proposition 3 For any policy
The policyq above is constructed from q by rearranging the prices (q e(i) , q e(i)+1 , . . . , q e(i+1)−1 ) between each two consecutive strong markups e(i) and e(i + 1) of q into a decreasing sequence and also rearranging the prices (q e(n) , q e(n)+1 , . . . , q L ) after the last strong markup into a decreasing sequence. Soq will consist of n + 1 decreasing sequences, and will be such that its markups and strong markups coincide.
To see how this works, fix q ∈ B n (L) and consider the string of prices (q e(1) , q e(1)+1 , . . . , q e(2)−1 ) between e(1) and e(2). At least one of these prices is strictly less than q e(1)−1 by the definition of e(2). Let the time of the first such price in the string be called e(1) + w + 1 (this naming convention is used to match the developments in the proof of the proposition). It must be that w ≤ k + 1, because otherwise e(1) would be an F-regeneration point. Also by the definition of e(2),
we must have q e(1)+w+1 ≥ q e(1)+w+2 ≥ · · · ≥ q e(2)−1 . Hence, to rearrange (q e(1) , q e(1)+1 , . . . , q e(2)−1 )
into a decreasing sequence, we need only rearrange the prices (q e(1) , . . . , q e(1)+w ) into a decreasing sequence and leave the other prices unchanged. See Figure 1 . With this rearrangement, revenues obtained in periods 1, . . . , e(1) − 1 remain unchanged. Likewise, the revenues collected in periods e(1) + w + 2, . . . , L remain unchanged as well. (To see this, note that the price q e(1)+w+1 in period e(1)+w+1 is unchanged by the rearrangement and that q e(1)+w+1 is the minimum price over periods 1, . . . , e(1)+w+1 both with and without the rearrangement. Therefore, by the definition of revenue function ρ t (·), the revenue collected in periods after e(1) + w + 1 does not change.) However, the total revenue accrued in periods e(1), . . . , e(1) + w + 1 increases with the rearrangement. This increase can be attributed to customers who initially arrive in periods e(1), . . . , e(1) + w + 1 (but not to customers who initially arrive earlier). Complete details are in the appendix.
We close this section with the observation that upon defining
, it follows from Proposition 3 that maximizing over B yields an average revenue that is no greater than that obtained by maximizing over E. .) The right panel shows the rearrangement of prices described above for periods (e(1), . . . , e(1) + w) = (3, . . . , 6). Here, the rearrangement yields a policyq in E n (L). In general, we would need to make similar rearrangements between each pair e(i) and e(i + 1) and after e(n).
Step 3 of the Proof
Here we establish that the best policy in E is no better than the best policy in D.
The proof of the preceding proposition is quite long. The main idea is as follows. We know that q ∈ arg max p∈E v(p) is an element of some E n (L). Consider the price q t(n) that begins the final piece s n of q at time t(n) = t. If we modify q by adding "enough" copies (say L ′ ) of q t(n) starting at time t + 1 and we push the prices q t(n)+1 , . . . , q L later by L ′ periods, then we obtain a new policy of length L + L ′ that has an F-regeneration point at time t and that also decreases from time t onward. See Figure 2 . It turns out that the average revenue from the decreasing policy that uses only the prices from t onward is at least the average revenue of q. Were this not the case, then q could be improved by removing the final string s n . 
Step 4 of the Proof
We now turn to the problem of maximizing v(p) over p ∈ D. The next proposition states that for this problem, it suffices to consider only those sequences with length less than k + m. Of course, the longest possible strictly decreasing sequence of prices is m, but recall that "decreasing" should be interpreted as non-increasing, that is, the price can strictly decrease or remain the same as time moves forward (and so the result is not vacuous).
Proposition 5 There exists
The key to the proposition is the fact that no prices need repeat after period k in an optimal policy. Then, since there are m distinct prices in the price set P, there is an optimal decreasing policy with length less than m + k. (In this discussion, "optimal" means optimal for the problem max{v(p) : p ∈ D}.) To see why there is no benefit from repeating a price after period k, consider an L ≥ m + k and a policy q that maximizes v(p) over D(L). It must be that q j = q j+1 for some j ≥ k. By removing q j+1 and shifting all later prices one period earlier, we arrive at a new policy q ′ which is in D(L − 1). Some careful thought reveals that the total revenue of q ′ is exactly
which is itself no greater than the average revenue of the sequence q because the average revenue of the best policy in D(L) is at least the optimal revenue of a one-period problem (or else the optimal solution to the one-period problem is itself better than q). Therefore, by removing such price repetitions from q, the average revenue gets no worse. Complete details are in the appendix.
Putting the Pieces Together
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By (6), the feasible set Ω in problem (5) can be expressed as Ω = B ∪ D.
By Propositions 3, 4, and 5 we have
. . ) ∈ P ∞ is an optimal solution to (2) by Propositions 1 and 2.
Computation, Refinements, and Extensions
In this section we develop a dynamic programming method for computing an optimal policy. The structure identified in Theorem 1 plays a crucial role in the approach. We also present some additional results, including an extension of Theorem 1 to problems with continuous price sets.
A Computational Approach
As seen in the proof of Theorem 1, to find an optimal policy, it suffices to maximize v(p) over
. . , m + k − 1 and then selecting the best of those m + k − 1 maximizers. The search space can be reduced to just L = k + 1, . . . , m + k − 1 when the assumption in Proposition 6 below holds.
Next we present a dynamic programming approach with a one-dimensional state variable. The we would need a k-dimensional state vector, rendering the problem computationally intractable for moderate or large k. To this end, fix L and let π t (x) denote the optimal revenue from time t onward in a L-period problem given that we have used a decreasing policy in periods i = 1, . . . , t − 1 and the price in period t − 1 was x ∈ P. The algorithm is as follows.
Step 1: Let π L+1 (x) = 0 for each x ∈ P.
Step 2: For t = L, . . . , 2 recursively compute
and let z t (x) be a maximizer of the right side above.
Step 3: Compute
and let z 1 denote an optimal solution, i.e., z 1 ∈ arg max z[1 − G(z)] + π 2 (z) .
Step
We note in closing that the decreasing policy δ L produced by this dynamic programming algorithm may have F-regeneration points if the final two prices in δ L are identical or if a price is repeated k or more times consecutively in δ L . If either of these two cases occur, then there is an
A Lower Bound on Optimal Cycle Lengths
The next result gives conditions under which we can further restrict the space in which we search for an optimal policy. Let q j ∈ arg max{V j (q) : q ∈ D(j)} = arg max{v j (q) : q ∈ D(j)} for j = 1, . . . , k + 1. For clarification, we note that the notation q j is used differently in the proof of Proposition 4.
The condition v 2 (q 2 ) ≥ v 1 (q 1 ) means that the best policy q 2 = (q 2 1 , q 2 2 ) in D(2) is at least as good as the best policy q 1 = (q 1 1 ) in D(1). If we consider a problem with two time periods, then the condition implies that under policy q 2 , more revenue is accrued from customers who initially arrive in period 1 than from customers who initially arrive in period 2. [Were this not the case, then the policy in D(1) that sets price q 2 2 in period 1 would be better than -that is, yield higher average revenue than -q 2 , which would contradict v 2 (q 2 ) ≥ v 1 (q 1 ).] In the proof of the proposition, we
provides the base case in that argument. A key piece of the inductive step is to show that for a j-period problem, under policy q j , the revenue accrued from customers who originally arrive in period 1 exceeds the average revenue per period over periods 2, . . . , j accrued from just those customers who initially arrive in periods 2, . . . , j. It is simple to compute v 2 (q 2 ) and v 1 (q 1 ), and therefore it is easy to check whether it holds that v 2 (q 2 ) ≥ v 1 (q 1 ).
Continuous Price Set
Our next result establishes that the decreasing cyclic structure in Theorem 1 holds even when the price set is infinite and prices are selected from P = [0,P ] whereP < ∞. In this case (2) becomes The uniform distribution function is Lipschitz continuous, and therefore Proposition 7 applies to settings where customers' valuations follow the uniform distribution.
The proof of the proposition involves passing to a limit through a sequence of problems, each with a finite price set that is a discretization of [0,P ]. The idea is to let the discretization of the price set become progressively finer, yielding progressively larger price sets that more closely approximate [0,P ]. For each problem in the sequence, we can apply Theorem 1 to see that there is an optimal decreasing cyclic policy for the discretized problem in question. One difficulty that arises is that the cardinality of the price set increases as the discretization becomes finer, and hence it is not immediately apparent what will keep the cycle length finite when we pass to the limit. This issue is resolved in Section G of the appendix, where Lemma G.2 allows us to establish a uniform upper bound on the cycle lengths of the optimal policies of the discretized problems.
Variable Patience Levels: Bounds and Heuristics
In this section we consider a problem involving customers with different patience levels. The model is the same as that described in Section 2, except we now assume that customers' patience levels range from 0 to K < ∞, and each level k accounts for a fraction of α k of customers where K k=0 α k = 1. A customer with a patience level k will wait up to k periods to make a purchase. So, a customer with patience level k = 0 is impatient in the sense described earlier. For p ∈ P ∞ let
where here G(
. The seller now wants to solve
Proposition 8 There exists a cyclic pricing policy with cycle length at most K(m − 1) + 1 that is an optimal solution to (8).
The proof of this result is identical to that of Proposition 1, and is omitted. It is seemingly a difficult task to identify additional structure of an optimal policy. It is also a difficult task to compute an optimal policy. Note that the computational approach from Section 5.1 relies on the fact that optimal cycles are decreasing, which need not be the case here. That approach can readily be modified to cover the variable patience levels now under consideration, but doing so yields a dynamic program with K-dimensional state variable. The main idea is to recursively compute π t (x t−K , . . . , x t−1 ), the maximum revenue from time t onward in an L-period problem given that the prices in periods t − K, . . . , t − 1 are x t−K , . . . , x t−1 . This can be done via the relation
with the convention that x j = 0 for j ≤ 0. Such dynamic programs are intractable except when K is small. Hence, we will confine ourselves to developing bounds and heuristics.
To do so, let ρ k t (p) denote the revenue function defined in (1) with α = 1 − α 0 and fixed patience level k. Likewise, let H k (p) = lim inf T →∞ T −1 T t=1 ρ k t (p) be the value of a policy p and let H k = sup{H k (p) : p ∈ P ∞ } denote the optimal value in (2). A little algebra shows that
Therefore, for the optimal cyclic policy p whose existence was established in Proposition 8, we have
Hence, we have established the following result, which states that the optimal value in (8) for the problem with variable patience levels is bounded above by a convex combination of optimal objective values of problems with fixed patience levels.
Proposition 9
The optimal value in (8) satisfies
We close this section by noting that it is straightforward to maximize H(·) over decreasing cyclic policies using a slight variation of the algorithm from Section 5.1. Specifically, in (9) we maximize over {z ∈ P : z ≤ x t−1 } and we can drop all arguments except x t−1 from the function produced by this procedure will generally not be an optimal policy -even though it is the best decreasing cyclic policy -because in this setting of variable patience levels, it may be the case that the optimal policy does not have decreasing cycles (i.e., H( q) < H). Nevertheless, this does provide a heuristic approach. We will consider this approach in some of the examples provided in Section H of the appendix.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, we consider dynamic pricing in the presence of patient customers. Our main result establishes that for arbitrary fixed patience levels and arbitrary valuation distributions, there is an optimal policy comprised of cycles of decreasing prices. We also provide bounds on the length of these cycles and present an algorithm for computing an optimal policy. Our work complements previous results that apply to problems with uniform valuation distributions in which patient customers are willing to wait one period to make a purchase. A direction for future research is to prove the conjecture that there are optimal policies with cycles of length k + 1 or k + 2, where k is the number of periods a patient customer is willing to wait to make a purchase. It would also be of interest to consider pricing problems with patient customers in which customer arrivals are stochastic. The models and policies discussed in this paper could potentially form the basis for heuristics in stochastic settings.
Appendix A More on the Literature
Here we provide a table that summarizes the main assumptions and results in those papers cited in Section 1 that establish optimality of cyclic pricing policies. The table is intended to provide a brief summary, and not to provide a complete explanation of all results in the cited papers or our paper. The demand in all the papers in the table is deterministic. The other papers cited in Section 1 (not listed in the table below) do not prove optimality of cyclic pricing policies. Decreasing cyclic policy is optimal.
Cycle length is at most k + m − 1 where m = cardinality of price set. Decreasing cyclic policy is optimal.
B Proof of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2
Lemma B.1 For any policy p ∈ P ∞ , the length of any component of p is at most κ; that is
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 1 of Besbes and Lobel (2012) . Consider a component (p r(i) , . . . , p r(i+1)−1 ) of a policy p, and suppose for a contradiction that the length of the component is greater than κ; i.e, r(i + 1) − r(i) > κ.
Let t 0 = r(i). There exists t 1 ∈ {t 0 +1, . . . , t 0 +k} such that p t 1 < p t 0 . Otherwise t 0 +1 = r(i)+1
would be an I-regeneration point of p in which case r(i+1) = t 0 +1 = r(i)+1, which would contradict our supposition that r(i + 1) − r(i) > κ. Note that t 1 ≤ t 0 + k.
Likewise, there exists t 2 ∈ {t 1 + 1, . . . , t 1 + k} such that p t 2 < p t 1 . Otherwise t 1 + 1 would be an I-regeneration point of p in which case r(i + 1) = t 1 + 1 ≤ t 0 + k + 1 = r(i) + k + 1, which would contradict our supposition that r(i + 1) − r(i) > κ. So there must exist a t 2 as claimed. Note that
Continuing in this fashion for j = 1, . . . , m, we see that there exist times {t j } with t j ∈ {t j−1 + 1, . . . , t j−1 + k} such that p t j < p t j−1 and t j ≤ t j−1 + k ≤ t 0 + jk.
We have now established that p t 0 > p t 1 > · · · > p tm , which is not possible because the cardinality of the price set P is m. Hence, the supposition that r(i + 1) − r(i) > κ cannot hold, and thus
Lemma B.2 Consider p ∈ P ∞ and suppose C i (p) = q ∈ P L for some i ≥ 0. Then q has no F-regeneration points. That is, if q ∈ P L is a component of policy p ∈ P ∞ , then q has no Fregeneration points.
Proof. Suppose q = C i (p) = (p r(i) , . . . , p r(i+1)−1 ) for some i so that L(q) = r(i + 1) − r(i) and q j = p r(i)+j−1 for j = 1, . . . , r(i + 1) − r(i). If L(q) = 1 the lemma is true. So we need only consider the case with L(q) ≥ 2. Suppose for a contradiction that q has an F-regeneration point at some time t ∈ {2, . . . , r(i + 1) − r(i)}. Then q t−1 ≤ min{q t , . . . , q min{t+k−1,r(i+1)−r(i)} }, and so p r(i)+t−2 ≤ min{p r(i)+t−1 , . . . , p min{r(i)+t+k−2,r(i+1)−1} } If r(i) + t + k − 2 ≤ r(i + 1) − 1, then p r(i)+t−2 ≤ min{p r(i)+t−1 , . . . , p r(i)+t+k−2 }, hence r(i) + t − 1 ∈ {r(i) + 1, . . . , r(i + 1) − 1} is an I-regeneration point of p, which contradicts the fact that q is a component of p. If r(i) + t + k − 2 > r(i + 1) − 1, then p r(i)+t−2 ≤ min{p r(i)+t−1 , . . . , p r(i+1)−1 }.
Moreover, p r(i+1)−1 ≤ min{p r(i+1) , . . . , p r(i+1)+k−1 } because r(i + 1) is an I-regeneration point of p. The preceding two inequalities imply that r(i) + t − 1 is an I-regeneration point of p, which is again a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix L ∈ N, q = (q 1 , . . . , q L ) ∈ P L , and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈ P ∞ .
Part 1a: We will show if q has no F-regeneration points, then C i (p) = q for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. Then for each t = 2, 3, . . . , L, there exists some s ∈ {t, . . . , min{t + k − 1, L}} with q t−1 > q s . Now consider p = (q, q, q, . . . ). For each t = 2, . . . , L and i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the time u = t + iL is such that p u−1 = p t+iL−1 = q t−1 > q s = p s+iL and
So p u−1 > p s+iL and s + iL ∈ {u, . . . , u + k − 1}. Hence, u is not an I-regeneration point of p, and consequently the only possible I-regeneration points of p are {1 + L, 1 + 2L, 1 + 3L, . . . }.
Next observe that q
such that q n = min{q 1 , . . . , q L } in which case time n + 1 would be an F-regeneration point of q, contradicting the original assumption that q has no F-regeneration points.) Therefore, for each This completes the proof of part 1 of the lemma.
Part 2: Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. By part 1, we have
This completes the proof of part 2 of the lemma.
Part 3: Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. It is clear that p = (q, q, q, . . . ) is cyclic. To show the cycle length is L = L(q), it suffices to show there does not exist a sequence q = ( q 1 , . . . , q l ) ∈ P l and finite integer n ≥ 2 such that q = ( q, q, . . . , q) and L = nl.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists such a sequence q. Suppose q i = min{ q 1 , . . . , q l }.
. . , q L }. Therefore, we have q i ≤ min{q i+1 , q i+2 , . . . , q L }, which implies that period i + 1 is an F-regeneration point, contradicting the fact that q has no F-regeneration points. This completes the proof of part 3 of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. For policy p ∈ P ∞ , define N T = max{i : r(i) ≤ T }. Then
The equality (10) is justified as follows. By Lemma B.1, we know the length of each component of p is at most κ, thus
is the sum of at most κ terms, each of which is bounded. Consequently, lim sup T →∞ 1 T T t=r(N T ) ρ t (p) = 0 and hence the equality holds. Since the length of each component of p is at most κ and P is finite, there are finitely many distinct components. Consider q = C i * (p) where i * ∈ arg max i v(C i (p)). By Lemma B.2, q has no F-regeneration points. By Lemma 1, the policy p ′ = (q, q, q, . . . ) built by repeating the component q in p with the largest average revenue is such that
and C j (p ′ ) = q for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Combining (10) and (11), we have that for any p ∈ P ∞ , there exists p ′ for which
where p ′ is a cyclic policy with cycle length at most κ, and C j (p ′ ) = q for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Therefore, we can rewrite the problem (2) as
The length of q is at most κ, so it follows that the set of q above is finite. Therefore, there exists a cyclic policy p * = (q * , q * , q * , . . . ) with L(q * ) ≤ κ that achieves the supremum in (2). Moreover, the cycle length of p * is L(q * ) by part 3 of Lemma 1. We have also established that C i (p * ) = q * for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let
Consider q = (q 1 , . . . , q L ) with L ≤ κ and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) with C i (p) = q for every i. Since C i (p) = q, by Lemma 1, q has no F-regeneration points and H(p) = v(q). Thus, Z ≤ Z ′ . Next consider q = (q 1 , . . . , q L ) with L ≤ κ such that q has no F-regeneration points. Then for p = (q, q, q, . . . ), by Lemma 1, we have C i (p) = q, and H(p) = v(q). Thus, Z ′ ≤ Z. Therefore, Z = Z ′ , which establishes the equivalence of problems (4) and (5).
C Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by introducing a new definition. With the aid of Lemma C.1 below, the definition allows us to understand the structure of policies in the set
n=1 B n (L), i.e., the structure of those policies in the feasible set of (5) that are not decreasing. As noted at the start of Section 4.2, a key step in our argument is showing that any policy in B can be improved by re-arranging prices between each pair of successive strong markups into a decreasing sequence. After such a re-arrangement, we arrive at a policy in the set E, which is made up of the sets {E n (L)}.
For n ≥ 1, define C n (L) as the set of sequences q ∈ P L with the property that q = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n ) where s i = (q τ (i) , . . . , q τ (i+1)−1 ) for some times {τ (i) : i = 0, . . . , n + 1} such that 1 = τ (0) < τ (1) < · · · < τ (n + 1) = L + 1 and 1. s 0 is decreasing (q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ · · · ≥ q τ (1)−1 ) 2. q τ (i)−1 < q τ (i) for i = 1, . . . , n 3. {t ∈ {τ (i) + 1, . . . , τ (i + 1) − 1} : q t < q τ (i)−1 } = ∅ for i = 1, . . . , n 4. min{t ∈ {τ (i) + 1, . . . , τ (i + 1) − 1} : q t < q τ (i)−1 } ∈ {τ (i) + 1, . . . , τ (i) + k − 1} for i = 1, . . . , n.
q τ
It is apparent that if q ∈ E n (L), then q ∈ C n (L) with {τ (i)} = {t(i)}. However, the converse is not true. The strings s 1 , . . . , s n must each be decreasing for a policy in E n (L), but they need not be decreasing for a policy in C n (L). Policies that are in C n (L) may have markups that are not strong markups. This is not the case for policies in E n (L). The purpose of introducing the sets {C n (L)} is to make the connection between B and E.
For q ∈ C n (L), time τ (i) + m(i) + 1 is the first time in {τ (i) + 1, . . . , τ (i + 1) − 1} that the price goes below q τ (i)−1 . Immediately after time τ (i) − 1, there are m(i) + 1 consecutive prices greater than or equal to q τ (i)−1 . The length of sequence s i is τ (i + 1) − τ (i). There is at least one price lower than q τ (i)−1 in s i by condition 3; therefore, we have
Observe also that for q ∈ C n (L), we have
Proof. Consider q ∈ B n (L). By the definition of B n (L), we know that q has no F-regeneration points and that q has exactly n strong markups: 2 ≤ e(1) < e(2) < · · · < e(n) ≤ L such that q e(i) > q e(i)−1 = min{q 1 , . . . , q e(i)−1 } < q e(i−1)−1 for i = 2, . . . , n. Let e(0) = 1, e(n + 1) = L + 1, then 1 = e(0) < e(1) < · · · < e(n + 1) = L + 1. Thus sequence q can be written in the form of q = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n ) where s i = (q e(i) , . . . , q e(i+1)−1 ) for i = 0, . . . , n.
Next we will show that conditions 1-5 in the definition of C n (L) are satisfied by taking τ (i) = e(i) for i = 0, . . . , n + 1.
Consider sequence s 0 . We have e(1) ≥ 2. Also we have q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ · · · ≥ q e(1)−1 , otherwise there would be a strong markup at some time t < e(1), which would contradict the definition of e(1) as the time of the first strong markup of q. Therefore, condition 1 holds. Next consider sequence s i = (q e(i) , q e(i)+1 , . . . , q e(i+1)−1 ) for i = 1, . . . , n. Observe that q e(i)−1 < q e(i) , so condition 2 holds. In sequence s i , there must exist at least one price strictly lower than q e(i)−1 . (For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, otherwise e(i + 1) would not be a strong markup of q. For i = n, otherwise e(i) would be an F-regeneration point.) This establishes condition 3. Suppose e(i) + w(i) + 1 is the first time that the price is strictly lower than q e(i)−1 , then we have min{q e(i) , . . . , q e(i)+w(i) } ≥ q e(i)−1 , which means that beginning at time e(i), there are w(i) + 1 consecutive prices greater than or equal to q e(i)−1 . We must have that w(i) + 1 ≤ k − 1, because otherwise e(i) would be an F-regeneration point (and we know q has no F-regeneration points). Hence, condition 4 holds.
Finally, if there are multiple prices strictly lower than q e(i)−1 in s i , we must have q e(i)+w(i)+1 ≥ q e(i)+w(i)+2 ≥ · · · ≥ q e(i+1)−1 , otherwise there would be a strong markup at some time t ∈ {e(i) + w(i) + 2, . . . , e(i + 1) − 1}, which would contradict the definition of e(i + 1) as the time of the (i + 1)th strong markup of q. Thus condition 5 holds.
By taking τ (i) = e(i) and m(i) = w(i), we see that q ∈ C n (L).
Lemma C.2 For any policy y ∈ P L with L ≤ k+1, consider the policy y constructed by rearranging the prices in y from largest to smallest. Then V (y) ≤ V ( y) and v(y) ≤ v( y). Therefore, for an L-period problem with L ≤ k + 1, there exists an optimal policy that is decreasing.
Proof. Consider y = ( y 1 , . . . , y L ) = (y i(1) , . . . , y i(L) ) obtained by re-arranging the prices in y = (y 1 , . . . , y L ) from the largest to smallest. Hence, i(t) denotes the time at which price y t (the tth largest price in y) appears in y. If a price (say p) appears more than once in y (say at times i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i n ) then for some t we have y t = y t+1 = · · · = y t+n−1 = p and we take
The quantity ϕ L i (y) is the revenue obtained from customers who initially arrive in period i under policy y. Hereafter, we drop the superscript. When L ≤ k + 1, the formula (14) reduces to
The final equality above holds because y is decreasing.
Hence, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ϕ i(t) (y) ≤ ϕ t ( y) for t = 1, . . . , L. To this end, fix t ∈ {1, . . . , L} and consider (15) with i = i(t):
Notice that the jth term in the summation in (17) is non-zero only if y j < min{y i(t) , . . . , y j−1 }, that is only if y j is the strict minimum of {y i(t) , . . . , y j }. (Figure 3 depicts an example with the following bookkeeping.) Let j(1) < j(2) < · · · < j(N ) denote those times j ∈ {i(t) + 1, . . . , L} at which y j < min{y i(t) , . . . , y j−1 }. By (17) we have
where we take j(0) = i(t) so y j(0) = y i(t) = y t .
Recall that y contains the prices of y rearranged in decreasing order. Therefore, {y j (1) , . . . ,
Let z(0) = t. Hence, for the ℓth term in the sum in (18), we have
where the inequality holds because y is decreasing.
Plugging back into (18) and then using (16) yields
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a sequence q ∈ B n (L). By Lemma C.1, q ∈ C n (L). Then q = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n ) where s i = (q τ (i) , q τ (i)+1 , . . . , q τ (i+1)−1 ) for i = 0, . . . , n. (17) is empty.
In subsequence s 1 , we know by (13) that there exists m(1) ∈ {0, . .
Let (q i(1) , q i(2) , . . . , q i(m(1)+1) ) be the re-arrangement of q τ (1) , . . . , q τ (1)+m(1) from largest to smallest, and consider another sequence q such that
The difference between sequences q and q is that subsequence s 1 in q is replaced by a reordered decreasing sequence in q. Lets 1 = ( q τ (1) , . . . , q τ (1)+m (1) , . . . , q τ (2)−1 ). Then q = (s 0 ,s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ).
Next we will show V L (q) ≤ V L ( q).
Since q t = q t for t ≤ τ (1) − 1, we have
Since s 0 is decreasing, we have
By (20) and the fact that q t = q t for t ≥ τ (1) + m(1) + 1, we have
and recall that q τ (1)+m(1)+1 = q τ (1)+m(1)+1 .
Consider policy q. Since min{q τ (1) , q τ (1)+1 , . . . , q τ (1)+m(1) } ≥ q τ (1)−1 , and q τ (1)+m(1)+1 < q τ (1)−1 , the customers who initially arrive before period τ (1) will not buy anything in periods τ (1), τ (1) + 1, . . . , τ (1) + m(1) and then some of them will purchase in period τ (1) + m(1) + 1. We use X to denote the revenue accrued in periods τ (1) 
where L(y) = m(1) + 2 and
where L( y) = m(1) + 2 and
By the definition of q, it is easy to see
Therefore, by (19), (21), and (22) 
Continuing in this fashion for subsequences s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s n , we obtain a sequenceq = (s 0 ,s 1 , . . . ,
D Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an arbitrary q ∈ E n (L) and define
The time t(i) + M (i) + 1 is the first time in {t(i) + 1, . . . , t(i + 1) − 1} that the price drops below q t(i)−1 . Immediately after time t(i) − 1, there are M (i) + 1 consecutive prices greater than or equal to q t(i)−1 . The length of sequence s i is t(i+1)−t(i), and there is at least one price lower than q t(i)−1 in s i by condition 3 in the definition of E n (L); therefore, we have
and thus M (i) ≤ k − 2. Hence,
Moreover,
For policy q ∈ E n (L), consider another policy q ′ with length L − 1 as follows.
Intuitively, q ′ is constructed from q by removing price q t(n) from q and shifting all prices originally in periods t(n) + 1, . . . , L one period earlier. We also consider another policy q ′′ = ψ(q) with length L + 1 as follows.
If we want to emphasize the dependence of q ′′ on q, we will use the notation ψ(q) to denote the sequence defined in (25). Intuitively, q ′′ is constructed from q by inserting a copy of price q t(n) in period t(n)+ 1 and shifting those prices originally in periods t(n)+ 1, . . . , L one period later. Define
It may be helpful to refer to Figure 4 to visualize the arguments in the proof of the following lemma. (24). The policy q ′ is constructed from q by removing price q t(n) from q and shifting all prices originally in periods t(n) + 1, . . . , L one period earlier. The dashed line through q t(n)−1 and q ′ t(n)−1 may be helpful for understanding the bookkeeping in the proof of Lemma D.1.
Proof. Fix q ∈ E n (L). Consider q ′ as defined in (24). To simplify our notation let t = t(n) = t(n|q) and M = M (n) = M (n|q). As in the proof of Lemma C.2 we have
is defined in (14) to be the revenue obtained from customers who arrive in period i when we use policy q. Likewise, we have
From the definition of q ′ and (14), it follows immediately that
To see this, observe that a customer who arrives in a period i ∈ {1, . . . , t + M − k − 1} sees the same sequence of prices in periods i, . . . , t − 1 under q ′ as he would under q. Moreover, under both q and q ′ , no prices in periods t, . . . , i + k fall below the price at time t − 1 because i
(Recall the definitions of t, M , and q ′ .) Hence, no customer that arrives in i ∈ {1, . . . , t+M −k −1} buys after time t − 1 under policy q or q ′ .
Therefore,
Similarly, we have that ϕ
Using the definitions of t, M , k, q ′ , and q ′′ , it can now be checked using (14) 
It is not hard to see that
In addition, let
Observe that if q ∈ arg max{v(p) : p ∈ E}, then q ∈ E and hence q ∈ E n for some n = 1, . . . , κ − 1. We will use the following lemma, which describes properties of such a q if it belongs to E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 .
Lemma D.2 Consider q ∈ arg max{v(p) : p ∈ E}. Suppose q ∈ E n and t(n) + M (n) ≥ k + 1.
Part 1: Suppose q ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 . Consider the sequence q ′ defined by (24). Observe that q ′ ∈ E,
by the optimality of q. (To emphasize how the condition q ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 is used in this argument, note that if q ∈ E 3 ∪ E 4 then q ′ is decreasing and hence not in E.) We
Consequently,
Part 2: Suppose v(q) > v 1 (x * ). Suppose for a contradiction that q ∈ E 3 − E * 3 . Then, q is such that n = 1, M (n) = k − 2, and q t(n)+1 = · · · = q t(n)+M (n) = q t(n)−1 . Construct the sequence q † ∈ E * 3 ⊂ E defined as follows,
We will show v(q † ) > v(q), which contradicts q ∈ arg max{v(p) : p ∈ E}.
From the definition of q † we have
The last inequality holds by the definition of x * . Thus,
Hence v(q † ) > v(q), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let
The set D 0 differs from D in two ways: elements of D 0 can have regeneration points and elements of D 0 can be slightly longer than those of D. Any element x ∈ D 0 with say ℓ regeneration points can be expressed as (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ , x ℓ+1 ) where x 1 , . . . , x ℓ+1 ∈ D and the average revenue of x is a convex combination of the average revenues of x 1 , . . . , x ℓ+1 . In particular,
Consider
], x ∈ P}, then we are done because
We consider two cases.
Case 1: t(n) + M (n) ≥ k + 1. We have two subcases, 1A and 1B below.
Below we will use the notation M (n|q) and t(n|q) to emphasize the dependence upon q. We will consider two possibilities, (i) and (ii). Recall (23). (ii) Suppose that M (n|q) < k − 2. Then M (n|q) = k − 2− l for some l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}. Consider q 1 = ψ(q). Then q 1 ∈ E n (L + 1) with t(n|q 1 ) = t(n|q) and M (n|q 1 ) = M (n|q) + 1. Consider the policy q 2 = ψ(q 1 ) = ψ(ψ(q)). If l = 1, then q 2 has an F-regeneration point at t(n|q).
For general l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, consider q l+1 ∈ P L+l+1 defined as follows: let q 0 = q, and q i = ψ(q i−1 ) ∈ P L+i for i = 1, . . . , l + 1. Intuitively, q i is obtained from q by inserting i new copies of price q t(n|q) into q at time periods t(n|q) + 1, . . . , t(n|q) + i and shifting all prices in q that appeared after t(n|q) "to the right" by i We can now combine (i) and (ii) to see that if M (n|q) = k − 2 − l for some l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2}
(which exhausts all possibilities because q ∈ E n (L)), then q l+1 has an F-regeneration point at time t(n|q). In addition, in either subcase, by construction, q i t(n|q i ) = q t(n|q) for i = 0, . . . , l. By Lemma D.2, we have
Since t(n|q) is an F-regeneration point of q l+1 , we can decompose q l+1 into two independent sub-
Observe that
and p 2 ∈ D 0 . If q ∈ E 1 , then p 1 ∈ E by (34) and therefore v(q) ≥ v(p 1 ). Combining this with (32) and (33), we have 
We have v L (q) > v 1 (x * ), so Lemma D.2 implies q ∈ E 4 ∪ E * 3 . We consider (i) k > 2 and (ii) k = 2 separately.
(i) Suppose k > 2. Consider sequence q ′′ as defined in (25). It is easy to see q ′′ ∈ E. Thus,
Now, consider sequence q ′ with length L − 1 as defined in (24). It is easy to see that q ′ ∈ D 0 and consequently
Thus we have proved
(ii) Suppose k = 2. Then E 3 = ∅. Hence, we need only consider q ∈ E 4 . Suppose for a contradiction that v(q) > v(d). Consider sequence q ′ with length L − 1 as defined in (24). It is
Consider sequence q ′′ as defined in (25). Note that q ′′ has an F-regeneration point at time t(1). We can decompose q ′′ into two independent decreasing sequences q ′′ = (p 1 , p 2 ) where
The last inequality is the supposition we made in hope of producing a contradiction.
On the other hand,
which contradicts (37).
Case 2:
Write q = (p 1 , p 2 ), where p 1 = (q 1 , . . . , q t(n)+M (n)+1 ) and p 2 = (q t(n)+M (n)+2 , . . . , q L ). Reorder p 1 into a decreasing sequence p 3 = (q i(1) , . . . , q i(t(n)+M (n)+1) ). Then consider another sequence p 0
Since t(n) + M (n) ≤ k, it follows that t(n) + M (n) + 1 ≤ k + 1. Hence, by Lemma C.2, we have
Since
Thus by (39) and (40), we have
. This completes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma E.1 For any policy y = (y 1 , . . . , y M +1 ) ∈ P M +1 with y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y M +1 and M ≤ k, consider the policyy defined byy t = y t+1 for t = 1, . . . , M . Then
where ϕ
Proof. Both y andy are decreasing, so by the definition of ρ t (·),
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider L ≥ k + m and q ∈ arg max{v L (p) : p ∈ D(L)}. We will establish that there exists a policy q
, from which the proposition follows. To this end, observe that it must be that q j = q j+1 for some j ∈ {k, . . . , L − 1} because there are m prices in P and q is decreasing. (For a policy of length at least k + m, at least one price must appear multiple times in period k or later. The policy q is decreasing, so such a price must appear in consecutive periods.)
we are done. Therefore we just need to consider the case that
Consider the sequence q † ∈ D(L − 1) ⊂ D as follows:
because j ≥ k and both q and q † are decreasing. Thus by (43) and (44) it is easy to see that
. . , L − 1, and hence
Therefore, by (42) and (45)
If L − 1 = k + m − 1 we are done with q • = q † . Otherwise we can remove a repeated price from q † in some period later than k while improving (or keeping the same) the average revenue as above.
We continue in this fashion until we arrive at q • with length k + m − 1 as desired.
F Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We will prove by induction that v j (q j ) ≤ v j+1 (q j+1 ) for j = 1, . . . , k when v 1 (q 1 ) ≤ v 2 (q 2 ).
When j = 1, we have v 1 (q 1 ) ≤ v 2 (q 2 ).
For any j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, suppose for the inductive hypothesis that
To complete the proof, we will show that v j (q j ) ≤ v j+1 (q j+1 ). By (14), we have
The preceding is the key piece of the inductive step mentioned in the main text after Proposition 6.
To see this, note that v j−1 ( q j−1 ) =
, which is the average revenue per period over periods 2, . . . , j accrued under policy q j from just those customers who initially arrive in periods 2, . . . , j. We now have
Consider q j+1 ∈ D(j + 1) as follows.
Hence
by (50). Therefore, we have
, which completes the inductive step.
We have now proved that
, from which the second statement in the proposition follows. If v 1 (q 1 ) < v 2 (q 2 ), then the above argument is easily modified to show that
Throughout this section, we use D(L) to denote the set of decreasing price sequences with no F-regeneration points where the individual prices are selected from the continuous price set [0,P ] .
Note that this is slightly different from D(L) as used Section 4, where prices are selected from a finite price set.
Since v 2 (·) is continuous and [0,P ] 2 is compact, the supremum is a maximum. By Lemma C.2
(which holds when P = [0,P ]) there is a decreasing sequence that is optimal. Therefore
Observe that d 2 is an element of D 0 (n, 2) for all n by construction of P(n). Note also that D 0 (n, L)
and D(n, L) are finite sets, and therefore the supremum of any real-valued function taken over those sets is in fact a maximum.
Before we prove Proposition 7, we state two lemmas. Proofs of the lemmas appear at the end of this section, after the proof of Proposition 7. 
by Theorem 1 (and its proof, which shows that the decreasing cycles in the theorem have no F-regeneration points when viewed in isolation).
We now take a brief detour and observe
with say ℓ regeneration points can be expressed as (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ , x ℓ+1 ) where
By (54), we now have
As an aside, we note that the second inequality above becomes an equality for n so large that
By (56) and Lemma 1, we see that
By (53) and (57) it follows that
Therefore there exists a decreasing cyclic policy that is an optimal solution to (2) when P = [0,P ].
In particular, any policy that attains the maximum in the optimization problem on the left side of (58) solves (2) for P = [0,P ].
Therefore, taking C = (1 + 2kα)(P A + 1) we have
The last inequality holds because each item inside the large curly braces is bounded above byP
Note that G(P ) = 1, so v 1 (P ) = 0. Thus, 
H Numerical Experiments
In this section we present the results of some numerical experiments. In the first set of experiments, we consider settings with fixed patience levels and we suppose that valuations for both patient and impatient customers are drawn from the beta distribution with parameters (a, b). The density of the beta distribution is given by f (x) = F ′ (x) = x a−1 (1 − x) b−1 /B(a, b) for x ∈ (0, 1) where
Taking a = b = 1 yields the uniform distribution on (0, 1). The mean and variance of the beta distribution with parameters (a, b) are given by µ = a/(a + b) and
In Table 2 , we consider examples with a = b so that the mean valuation is fixed at µ = 1/2, the variance is σ 2 = 1/(8a + 4), the coefficient of variation is cv = σ/µ = 1/ √ 2a + 1, and the valuation density is symmetric about 1/2. We set m = 10 with prices evenly spaced on (0, 1]; that is, the price set is P = {1/10, 2/10, . . . , 9/10, 1}. The pairs of numbers in the table denote the optimal cycle length and the optimal average revenue for particular values of α, k, and a. For example, the optimal cycle length is 4 and optimal average revenue is 0.2736 for α = 0.5, k = 2, and a = b = 2.
The variance of the valuations decreases as a (and therefore b) increases. Hence, as we move to the right in the table, we get examples with lower variances and lower coefficients of variation. When a = b > 1 the mode (the maximum value of the density) occurs at 1/2, and as a gets bigger the distribution becomes more concentrated around 1/2. For a = b < 1 the density has a "U shape"
and is minimized at 1/2 and grows without bound as x ↓ 0 or x ↑ 1. As a becomes smaller, the distribution becomes more concentrated just above 0 and just below 1.
As expected, the revenue increases in k and in α (it is simple to prove this). For fixed k and α the revenue is lowest when a = 1, which is the case of the uniform distribution. Revenue increases as a function of the variance of the valuation distribution for a < 1 and decreases in the variance when a > 1. This is perhaps counterintuitive at first because one might expect revenue to decrease as a function of the variance, given a fixed mean. This phenomenon can be explained as follows.
Although the variance increases as a goes down to 0, the distribution becomes more concentrated in a sense as noted in the previous paragraph, and therefore one may view the "variability" to be low even though the variance is itself high (of course, variance is only a summary measure of variability). In the limit as a ↓ 0, one may view the distribution as essentially placing mass 1/2 at both 0 and 1, and indeed it turns out that the revenue converges to 1/2 as a ↓ 0. (Note that if the valuation distribution places mass 1/2 at both 0 and 1, then it is optimal to always price at 1, yielding a revenue of 1/2.) As a ↑ ∞, the valuation distribution becomes essentially a unit mass at 1/2. In that case the revenue also approaches 1/2. (Note that if the valuation distribution places mass 1 at 1/2, then it is optimal to always price at 1/2, yielding a revenue of 1/2.)
The optimal cycle length is either 1 (fixed price), k + 1, or k + 2 for all the examples shown on Table 2 . We have seen the same in other examples, and in fact, we have not been able to find any examples in which the optimal cycle length exceeds k + 2. We conjecture that there are broad conditions under which there is an optimal policy with cycle length of either k + 1 or k + 2. Recall that for uniform valuations and continuous price set, Ahn et al. (2007) have previously established that there is an optimal policy with cycles of length 2 for problems with k = 1. As further support for the conjecture, we have also proved through a different argument (not presented here) that for uniform valuations and continuous price set, there is an optimal policy with cycles of length 3
for problems with k = 2. However, neither of these arguments appears to readily extend to more general settings. Therefore, it is an open problem to prove the conjecture. We also considered a variety of examples in which valuations follow the gamma distribution. In those examples (not shown) we found that for a given mean valuation, the optimal average revenue decreases in the variance of the valuation. This is consistent with intuition.
The next set of examples is shown in Table 3 , where we consider variable patience levels as described in Section 6. We take K = 2 so that patient customers are willing to wait either 1 or 2 periods (and impatient customers will not wait). In the examples we assume that valuations are uniformly distributed on (0, 1) and we assume that the fraction of customers that is impatient is α 0 = 0.2. We take m = 50 prices evenly spaced on (0, 1]. For K = 2, we can use the recursion (9) to compute an optimal policy and the associated optimal revenue. Hence, these examples allow us to make some assessment of the quality of the upper boundH from Proposition 9 and also to evaluate the performance H( q) of the best decreasing cyclic policy q for problems with variable patience levels. The columns in the table correspond to different combinations of (α 1 , α 2 ), which are the fractions of customers with patience levels 1 and 2. As we move rightward in the table, customers become less patient. In five of the seven examples, a decreasing cyclic policy turns out to be optimal. In the other two, the best decreasing policy achieves 99.9% of the optimal revenue.
The upper bound on the optimal revenue is also quite tight. Overall, Table 3 suggests that the best decreasing policy works well for K = 2 when customer valuations are uniform. Is this still the case with larger K and different valuation distribution? We take this up next. In Table 4 , we consider variable patience levels but with larger values of K, namely K = 4 and K = 10. For these values, it is not practical to compute an optimal policy with (9), so we instead obtain the best decreasing cyclic policy and compare it against the upper boundH from Proposition 9. In these examples we suppose that valuations are drawn from the gamma distribution with parameters n = λ = 1/2 so that the mean valuation is µ = 1 and the variance is σ 2 = 2.
The table shows various different values of α 0 . For each, we considered three different problem instances. In instance i, we take α i = (1 − α 0 )/K for i = 1, . . . , K, which means the fraction of customers with each patience level is the same. In instance ii, we take α 1 = α K = (1 − α 0 )/2, which means half of the patient customers have patience level 1 and the other half have patience level K. In instance iii, we take α K/2 = α K/2+1 = (1 − α 0 )/2, which means half of the patient customers have patience level K/2 and the other half have patience level K/2 + 1. Instances i and
ii represent situations where the problem in question is dissimilar to a problem with fixed patience levels, whereas instance iii represents a case where the problem is "almost" a problem with a fixed patience level. Not surprisingly, the best decreasing policy does quite well in instance iii, attaining at least 99% of the optimal revenue in each case. However, in instances i and ii the best decreasing policy may not perform as well. For example, when α 0 = 0 and K = 10, the best decreasing policy attains roughly 89% of the upper bound. Note that the comparison is made against the upper bound, so it is not possible to tell if the gap arises from a shortcoming of decreasing cyclic policies or because the upper bound is loose. The table suggests that the ratio H( q)/H decreases as K gets bigger, which is not surprising. Even for K = 10, the best decreasing policy performs reasonably well in all instances. 
